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Editorial: Behave, Global South! Economics, Experiments, Evidence 
 
The world’s poor are poor because they tend to make the wrong decisions. Flexibly formulated pol-
icy interventions and carefully designed choice architectures – based on real evidence about the 
poor’s real behavior and what works and what does not, evidence that has been gathered in random-
ized control trials – will help the poor to make the right decisions and hence make poverty history. 
This is the story of last year’s World Development Report (WDR) titled “Mind, Society and Behav-
ior”, signposting a shift in development policies towards behavioral and experimental economics. 
The rationale for the report’s approach is neatly expressed in the following quote: “Behavioral eco-
nomics reveals that (…) poor people make mistakes that end up making them poorer, sicker, and 
less happy. (If they didn’t, they could quickly escape poverty by selling self-help classes to the rest 
of us.) Identifying and correcting these mistakes is a prerequisite for solving global poverty” (Kar-
lan and Appel, 2011: 20).  
We think it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of arguments like these. The 2015 
WDR is not just another iteration of dated perspectives. “Mind, Society and Behavior” potentially 
marks a radical break in development policy delivery and the rise of a new orthodoxy in economics 
with implications that go far beyond the field of development policy. On the face of it the report 
asks for more efficient development policies and interventions. This is hardly a novel request. What 
is new though, from the perspective of the authors of the WDR, is how this goal can be achieved, 
that is, through “paying attention to how humans think (the processes of mind) and how history and 
context shape thinking (the influence of society)” (World Bank, 2015: 2). Again, taking context into 
account in order to meaningfully understand the world is not quite a revelation. After all, this is 
what geographers, sociologists, anthropologists and qualitative social science have been doing for a 
century. But this unique combination of epistemology, methods and policies is indeed a fundamen-
tal shift in the performative relation of science and society.  
The point of departure of the report is behavioral economics (BE) and the distinction between two 
systems of thinking:  Automatic thinking and deliberative thinking (Chapter 1). Taken from cogni-
tive psychology and what is referred to as “dual process model”, the argument is that judgments can 
ideally be produced in two ways, “a rapid, associative, automatic, and effortless intuitive process 
(sometimes called System 1), and a slower, rule-governed, deliberate and effortful process (System 
2)” (Kahneman, 2002: 8; see also Kahneman, 2011: 20-24). System 1 is automatic and unconscious. 
System 2 is rule-based, rational and explicit. It ‘monitors’ system 1 and is able to rationalize ideas 
and feelings that were generated by system 1. It is also able to correct or replace erroneous intuitive 
judgments. However, this does not happen all the time. Since system 2 has its limits, system 1 often 
prevails, leading to large and systematic mistakes (Kahneman, 2002: 8). These decisions are also 
influenced by social and cultural context, labeled in the WDR as “thinking socially” and “thinking 
with mental models” respectively (Chapters 2 and 3). Poverty is discussed at length in Chapter 4 of 
the report, however, it is not seen to derive from the relational effects of structural unevenness, of 
political or economic conditions, poverty is simply the context of thinking. “It is the context of pov-
erty that modifies decision making in important ways” (World Bank 2015: 81). What is relevant for 
behavioral economics, therefore, is the effect of poverty on individual decision-making. Poor peo-
ple lack the resources to think deliberately and have to rely more heavily on automatic decision. 
Poverty is therefore considered a “cognitive tax”, an example even referring to a loss of 10 IQ 
points (World Bank 2015: 14)! 
By rendering poverty a behavioral issue, policy interventions are legitimized that target human 
choice and action (behavior), turning “highly cost-effective behavioral interventions” (World Bank 
2015: 13) into the new gold standard for development policies. We write this editorial to call for 
more engagement with the implications of these changes for geography. While there has been some 
outstanding geographic work on behavioral economic-informed policy-making (Jones et al., 2013), 
and an emerging geographic literature on randomization and field experiments (e.g. Webber, 2015), 
it has been remarkably silent within economic and development geography with respect to the new 
orthodoxy in economics, that is behavioral and experimental economics (see also Berndt, 2015). 
Reading carefully through the report, we identified four rather worrisome tendencies that demand 
attention: (1) a radical neo-individualism, (2) the oxymoronic framing of policies as some kind of 
soft paternalism, (3) an interesting design of distributed agency, and (4) a reflexive play of experi-
mental interventions. 
Neo-individualism 
In line with the general thrust of behavioral economic thinking, the WDR acknowledges that mar-
kets are critical for poverty reduction, but argues that they do not work particularly well for the poor 
in the global south. In trying to explain why markets are not working as they should, the “blame” is 
directed at the poor themselves: the “problem of poverty” being located within the effect of individ-
ual decisions. “[P]eople think fast, relying on intuition more often than careful analysis”, argue the 
WDR authors in an online review of the report, “making most judgments and most choices auto-
matically” (World Bank, 2014). Rather than solely being interested in improving institutions to 
solve “problems between people”, the emerging behavioral approach to poverty therefore puts em-
phasis on “problems within individuals” (Mullainathan, 2005: 67; emphasis removed from origi-
nal). This shift from the market to the individual subject as a target of policy interventions also en-
tails a methodological reformulation: Based on assumptions about atomistic behavior, individualism 
used to be the key to the neoclassical modeling of macro phenomena; now the individual is ad-
dressed in order to bring individual behavior in line with the assumptions of macro models of socie-
ties. This is what we call “neo-individualism”. We chose this term also to highlight that the gap be-
tween both perspectives is not nearly as wide as we are often made to believe. Protagonists of be-
havioralism in development economics continue to conceptualize the poor as means–ends-oriented, 
weakening the neoclassical assumption that they are all-knowing and perfect calculators only to 
some extent. They may scratch the positive surface of the neoclassical project (i.e. describing and 
predicting accurately what people actually do), but ultimately strengthen its more far-reaching nor-
mative aspirations (i.e. the idea that rational maximization is what people should do). In so doing 
the emerging new orthodoxy actually provides a means to stabilize the neoclassical project during 
turbulent times, translating it into a utopian yardstick to measure concrete economic behavior and as 
a behavioral norm performing economic realities. 
Soft paternalism? 
Signposted as a sort of “third way”, protagonists of the behavioral turn in development distance 
themselves both from neoclassical market-oriented policies as well as from traditional development 
aid and large-scale state interventions. Both market and state are found wanting. Against this, pro-
ponents of BE claim to occupy the middle ground, the WDR (p. 20) for instance arguing that “psy-
chological and social factors involved in decision making [offer]’low-hanging fruit’ – that is, poli-
cies with relatively large gains at relatively low cost”. This resonates with the suggestion of asym-
metric or libertarian paternalism in the scholarly literature as an institutional frame that is capable of 
intervening politically with as much state as necessary and as much free market as possible. Both 
terms depict policies that are “smart”, that is, policies that help those who are less sophisticated 
cognitively “while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational” (Camerer et al., 2003: 
1212; see also Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 249).  Libertarian paternalist interventions turn into 
means to change behavior, being capable of curing the behavioral defects that are ultimately made 
responsible for poverty and underdevelopment. However, given that behavior can be expected ‘to 
be adaptive’ there is hope: “market players can ‘learn’ more efficient behavior” (Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, 2008, p. 8). The market is capable of healing the behavioral defi-
ciencies by disentangling the rural poor from the bonds of traditional cultural and social conditions 
and by enabling them to take the initiative into their own hands (Anderson and Stamoulis, 2006: 
24). However, it should be added, that for those who are subject to these interventions there is often 
little softness in the paternalism prescribed. We are confronted with only thinly veiled pretensions 
to engage in outright behavioral engineering and the “breaking” of inefficient habits (OECD, 2012: 
45).  
Design of distributed agency 
The development economists “in the wild” who translate behaviorist thinking into concrete inter-
ventions are fully aware that much more is needed for successful behavior change then the presence 
of socially embedded human beings (e.g. interventions that make use of peer relations). This refers 
to the material side of the behavioral turn in development. One could frame the interventions in 
question as sociotechnical medicine that assembles a carefully arranged network of humans and 
non-humans. In this assemblage agency is purposefully designed as being distributed between het-
erogeneous elements. Amongst these market devices play a crucial role in bringing about what BE 
protagonists refer to technocratically as “choice architectures”. In this context a key ingredient of 
the behavioral medicine concerns so-called “nudges”. Following Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) best-
selling book, nudging is about the construction and management of incentive structures in order to 
channel the behavior of “humans” into a direction that is deemed socially beneficial. The WDR 
points out that these nudges are “simple and often inexpensive (...) [and] may even play on the be-
havioral patterns and use them in smart ways“ (p. 120). Nudges include framing information, an-
choring, simplification of products and procedures, and also reminders and commitment devices (p. 
36). Commitment devices for savings, for instance, see to it that consumers voluntarily stop with-
drawing money from their accounts until a certain target level is reached. Simple text messages re-
mind the recipient not to forget to buy subsidized fertilizer in a given time window, or there is the 
supply of critical market or production data in a way that smallholders are almost forced to calcu-
late and to entertain the idea of whether or not to take more risks. This prepares the ground for a 
radical decontextualization of the issues at hand: wider societal issues being translated into tech-
nical problems that can be corrected with the help of behavioral engineering and experimentalism. 
Experimental interventions 
The idea of behavioral change is far from being novel: after all the disciplining of subjects is what 
modernity is all about. What is novel is the experimental design and the evidence-based logic of 
these interventions. Interventions have to be adaptive, monitoring themselves in “ongoing experi-
mentation” (World Bank, 2015: 20). Learning takes place within interventions and feeds back into 
“redefining, rediagnosing, and redesigning programs in a cycle of continued improvement” (ibid.). 
While the Report is attentive to a broad scheme of different research methods, the interventions ul-
timately have to be based on hard facts about what works and what does not, or in the deceptively 
simple words of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo: “We need evidence” (2011: 4).  
A crucial step has been the development of the field experiments and randomization. This method is 
used to neutralize differences between groups. Subjects are assigned randomly to either control or 
experimental group, under the assumption that variations with regard to unidentified factors will be 
distributed evenly across the groups (Guala, 2005: 62ff). Although the underlying principle is the 
classical economic notion of “ceteris paribus” (all other things being held equal), randomization 
travelled into economics from the medical world where the so-called randomized controlled trial 
(RCT) has long been an established procedure in the context of clinical investigation. Randomiza-
tion plays a crucial role in the spread of behavioral thinking into the policy realm. While this in-
cludes examples in the global north, it has been in the context of development in the global south 
that this technology has really taken off. All this has profound political implications. This crucially 
concerns the rationale of hard evidence, linking the method with the wider trend towards evidence-
based policy delivery. But the RCTs also seep into politics in more subtle ways: there is no RCT for 
political economy or macroeconomics, it is only certain fields that can provide “evidence” – and if 
you cannot do RCTs, you are practically asking the wrong questions. 
 
The exact way in which this particular form of market-based development is being played out on 
the ground is of course an empirical matter. The script of behavioral engineering is surely not in-
scribed on docile peasant bodies, passively performing the subjectivities it is naming. This qualifi-
cation makes it even more important to critically engage with the fact that behaviorism and experi-
mentalism more generally have almost become a new “orthodoxy” in mainstream economics. Not 
least because of the overtly simplistic geography informing the scholarly and policy literature: In-
terventions always aim at changes “in place” – within a region, within a village, within a person. 
Hidden from view are other entanglements, for instance, the fact that the integration into global 
production and consumption networks is a highly uneven and volatile affair. There are reasons 
therefore to be watchful given the impacts on development policy and practice and the fact that the 
trend is certainly not confined to rural settings in the global south. 
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